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RICCI V DESTEFANO AND DISPARATE TREATMENT:
HOW THE CASE MAKES TITLE VII AND THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE UNWORKABLE
ALLEN

R. KAMP*

I. INTRODUCTION
Although early commentators have focused on Ricci v. DeStefano's'
discussion of disparate impact, 2 I see what Ricci is saying about disparate
treatment as being more important. The majority and concurring opinions
make proving disparate treatment much easier than under prior law. One
Copyright C 2011, Allen R. Kamp.
* Professor of Law John Marshall Law School. J.D. University of Chicago, 1969; M.A.
University of California at Irvine, 1967; A.B. University of California at Berkeley, 1964. I
would like to thank Professors Joseph Seiner, Michael Zimmer, and Kermit Roosevelt for
their support and comments, my research assistant, Cameron Seward for his tireless efforts,
and the John Marshall Law School faculty secretaries for their help.
' 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
2 See, e.g., Lynda L. Arakawa & Michele Park Sonen, Comment, Caught in the
Backdraft: The Implications of Ricci v. DeStefano on Voluntary Compliance and Title VII,
32 U. HAW. L. REV. 463, 464 (2010) (arguing that the standard created to solve Ricci, the
strong-basis-in-evidence standard, discourages proactive and voluntary responses by
employers to rectify problems of disparate impact); Joseph L. Gastwirth & Weiwen Miao,
Formal Statistical Analysis of the Data in Disparate Impact Cases Provides Sounder
Inferences than the U.S. Government's 'Four-Fifths' Rule: An Examination of the
Statistical Evidence in Ricci v. DeStefano, 8 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 171, 173 (2009)
(explaining how statistics can be used to clarify the disparate impact issues in Ricci);
Hannah L. Weiner, Note, The Subordinated Meaning of "Color-Blind": How John
Marshall Harlan's Words Have Been Erroneously Commandeered, 11 J.L. & Soc.
CHALLENGEs 45, 46-47 (2009) (arguing that Justice Harlan supported protections against
disparate impact, but the original intent and meaning behind his words have been
undermined by conservatives); Bruce Willoughby, Effect of the Ricci v. DeStefano
Decision on Private Employers, 17 NEV. LAW. 31, 31 (2009) (concluding that employers
can avoid liability for testing results under Ricci by "continu[ing] with the [test] selection
process and ignorting] any disparate impact that may occur"); Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly
West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: White(ning) Discrimination, Race-ing Test Fairness 1-2
(Loyola U. L. Sch., Research Paper No. 09-49, 2009), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1507344 (considering the facts of Ricci in light of prior disparate impact cases and
concluding that Ricci weakened disparate impact law).
See, e.g., Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2674-77 (referring to the adoption by the Court of the
strong-basis-in-evidence standard); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986
(continued)
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would think that such a change in the law would further the cause of
ending discrimination both under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, but paradoxically, it may utterly defeat that
cause.
One can see Ricci as the case in which the Court came down in favor
of one of two competing interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause and
Title VII.4 Hannah L. Weiner describes the two approaches as "antisubordination" and "anti-classification." 5 The anti-subordination principle
"is most concerned with actions of a majority race to intentionally
subjugate members of a minority race .... [I]t is when government serves
to 'perpetuate ... the subordinate status of a specially disadvantaged
group' that the Fourteenth Amendment is most implicated."'6
The anti-classification principle instead sees equal protection as
invalidating all distinctions based on race.' Whether the classification is
malicious or benign, or whether an individual belongs to a historical or
8
contemporary dominant or subordinate race, does not matter. All such
9
classifications are invalid.

(1988) (exemplifying the law of disparate treatment and disparate impact prior to Ricci);
Michael J. Zimmer, Ricci's "Color-Blind" Standard in a Race Conscious Society: A Case of
Unintended Consequences? 3-4 (Loy. U. Chi. Sch. of L., Research Paper No. 2009-0020,
2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1529438 (explaining how the conservative
majority in Ricci may have inadvertently made it easier for plaintiffs to prove their disparate
treatment cases by creating a defense to disparate treatment in disparate impact law and
using the strong basis in evidence standard to prove such defense).
4 See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2681-82 (Scalia, J., concurring) (questioning the constitutional
validity of disparate impact, and thus, favoring disparate treatment as the antidiscrimination
principle that will eventually carry the day).
5 Weiner, supra note 2, at 47; see also Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination
and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARv. L. REV.
1470 (2004).
6 Weiner, supra note 2, at 47-48 (quoting Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal
ProtectionClause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 157 (1976)).
7
Id. at 48.
s Id.

9 Id. But see Harris & West-Faulcon, supra 2, at 1 ("This Article explicates how Ricci
facilitates this racial project in two distinct but interrelated ways: by whitening
discrimination-that is reframing anti-discrimination law's presumptions and burdens to
focus on disparate treatment of whites as the paradigmatic and ultimately preferred claim;
and by race-ing test fairness-that is, treating efforts to use job-related assessment tools that
correct racial imbalance and better measure merit as racially disparate treatment of whites.
(continued)
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The best way to understand the differing judicial opinions in Ricci is to
see them as applying two different interpretations of antidiscrimination
law: anti-classification and anti-subordination."o
Professor Reva B.
Siegel's article, Equality Talk, lays out the convoluted (and ironic) history
of these two views by focusing on the early debates over Brown v. Board
of Education." As she states: "The debates over Brown's implementation
show the complex ways in which concerns about legitimacy have moved
courts to mask and to limit a constitutional regime that would intervene in
the affairs of the powerful on behalf of the powerless." 2
The first debates over Brown focused on the opinion's emphasis on the
harm segregation inflicted on black schoolchildren: "To separate [children]
from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."' 3
Critics of Brown attacked the case by arguing that no such racial harm
existed, but if it did exist, it did not rise to the level of a Constitutional
injury justifying the relief of desegregation.14 Supporters of Brown, in
response, then attempted to shift the debate to one concerned with racial
classification, thus, avoiding the empirical and legal debates about harm.' 5
So, originally, the pro-segregationists preferred the discourse of antisubordination; the integrationists, anti-classification.16
In the 1960s and 1970s, however, anti-classification discourse came to
have a double function: as well as justifying Brown, it also limited its
reach.' 7
Ricci whitens discrimination in part by treating all forms of racial attentiveness-here the
City's assessment of the promotional exams' racial impact-as racial discrimination.").
10 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009); Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel,
The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 9, 11-12 (2003) (arguing that these two principles of antidiscrimination law
are legacies of the civil rights movement: "Cases like Brown .. . contained language
condemning the practice of classifying citizens by race as well as language condemning
practices that enforced subordination or inflicted status harm.").
" 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see Siegel, supra note 5, at 1474-75.
12 Siegel, supra note 5, at 1475.
'3 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494; Siegel, supra note 5, at 1476.
14 Siegel, supra note 5, at 1484-87.
" Id. at 1476.
16 See id. (arguing that the Court's southern critics framed their arguments by asking
which harms the Court should intervene to redress).
7
Id. at 1477.
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This dynamic played itself out in any number of areas: in
matters concerning the scope of remedy in the South,
liability for so-called de facto discrimination in the North,
and the question whether state actors were permitted to
correct racial imbalance in the absence of judicial
decree-a question that evolved into the modern debate
over affirmative action.' 8
Harriet Weiner, in an excellent student note, takes up the story with the
opinions of Clarence Thomas.' 9
Justice Thomas's opinions have
continually referred to Justice Harlan's statement, "our Constitution is
color-blind," as the basis for his attack on affirmative action.20 It is this
slogan and the adoption of the anti-classification principle that underlie the
majority opinion in Ricci.
Ricci (or at least the majority five justices) rejects the antisubordination approach: 2 ' the fact that there were few minority firefighters
in the New Haven fire department was of no consequence.22 The fact that
the results of the test only perpetuated their under-representation would
excuse discarding the first test only if there were a strong basis in evidence
of disparate impact.23 Moreover, Justice Scalia called into question the
constitutionality of disparate impact because it necessitates racial
classification.24 As stated by Professor Kermit Roosevelt, "in fact
[Scalia's] five-justice majority has been responsible for changing Equal
Protection jurisprudence from a doctrine that protects minorities into one
that prohibits certain kinds of classifications, regardless of who's benefited
and who's burdened."25 One can read Ricci as holding that an employer's
adoption of the anti-subordination principle is itself illegal
18

Id.

19See Hannah L. Weiner, Note, The Next "Great Dissenter"?How Clarence Thomas Is

Using the Words and Principals of John Marshall Harlan to Craft a New Era of Civil
Rights, 58 DuKE L.J. 139, 161-70 (2008).
20 Id. at 164-65; see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.
1, 551
U.S. 701, 772 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
21 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2673, 2681
(2009).
22 See id. at 2691 (demonstrating the Court's awareness of the fact that minorities
were
underrepresented in the fire department).
23 Id. at 2676.
24 Id. at 2681-82. Justice Alito's concurrence, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas,
makes the same point. Id. at 2683-84.
25 Kermit Roosevelt, Justice Scalia's Constitution-andOurs, 8 J.L. & Soc.
CHANGE
27, 32 (2005).
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discrimination. 26 Employment is seen as a zero-sum game: changing the
system for the benefit of minorities necessarily constitutes discrimination
against non-minorities. 21
This article's thesis is that this approach, as applied in Ricci, leads to
several disturbing questions about both employment and equal protection
law, including whether Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause will have
to be repealed to achieve their purposes.
II. THE CASE
To fill eight vacant lieutenant and seven vacant captain positions in its
fire department, the City of New Haven, Connecticut issued two job
related exams, one written and one oral, to determine relevant
qualifications for promotion. 28 As mandated by its charter (Charter), New
Haven was required to place in those vacant positions the most qualified
individuals as determined by the results of the tests. 29 According to the
Charter's "rule of three," one eligible candidate from the top three overall
scorers was to be chosen for each vacancy.30 It was the responsibility of
the New Haven Civil Service Board (CSB) to certify the ranks given to
each test taker who passed the written test.31
The results would determine both the eligibility and the order of
32
Preparation for the
eligibility for a promotion in the next two years.
exam came at a high mental and financial cost to many of the firefighters.3 3
The result of the exams administered to 118 firefighters in 2003 was that
the white candidates disproportionately outperformed minority
candidates.34 At the final New Haven CSB meeting, the CSB ultimately
voted not to certify the results to avoid liability under the disparate impact
See Helen Norton, The Supreme Court's Post-Racial Turn Towards a Zero-Sum
Understandingof Equality, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 229 (2010) ("The Court now,
however, appears to treat a decision maker's attention to the disparities experienced by
members of traditionally subordinated racial groups--that is, its antisubordination ends-as
inextricable from an intent to discriminate against others, and thus sufficiently suspicious to
demand justification.").
27
Id. at 233, 248.
28 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2665-66.
29
Id. at 2665.
26

30

id,

31 Id. at 2665,

2667.
at 2664.
" Id. at 2664, 2689.
34 d
32 Id.
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provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.3s In the end, the
examinations were thrown out, and those who performed well were denied
promotions. 6
A group of white firefighters (including Benjamin Vargas, a Latino),
who likely would have been promoted based on their high scores, sued
claiming the City violated both Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.37 With much fanfare and notoriety, the
case reached the United States Supreme Court.38 In a highly publicized
opinion, the Court reversed the decision of the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. 3 9 The five-to-four majority
held that race-based action, like that taken by New Haven in dismissing the
results of the racially neutral and fair tests, is impermissible under Title VII
unless the employer can demonstrate a strong basis of evidence that it
would have been liable under the disparate impact statute had it not taken
the action in question. 4 0 The Court determined because New Haven was
liable under Title VII, it need not address the Equal Protection violation.4'

II. How Ricci DEFINES DISPARATE TREATMENT
A. PriorLaw
Anyone who tries to describe how Ricci changed the definition of
"disparate treatment" is immediately faced with a problem: the Court has
42
never been precise in defining what constitutes disparate treatment.

3

Id. at 2671.

" Id. at 2664, 2689.
38 See Joan Biskupic, FirefighterCase May Keep Sotomayer in Hot Seat,
USA TODAY,
June 1, 2009, at 2A; Joan Biskupic, The Supreme Court Tackles Race, Series of Cases
Could Alter Civil Rights Laws, USA TODAY, Apr. 21, 2009, at lA; Adam Liptak, Justices to
Hear White Firefighters' Bias Claims, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2009, at Al; Kimberly WestFaulcon, A Test Casefor Diversity,L.A. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2009, at A33.
3 See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2664.
40
d
41Id. at 2664-65.

See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (indicating disparate
treatment of men and women in employment includes "requiring people to work in a
discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment"); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487
U.S. 977, 985-86 (1988) (speaking only to "'disparate treatment' cases, which involve 'the
most easily understood type of discrimination"'); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977) ("'Disparate treatment' . . . is the most easily understood
(continued)
42
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Intent is a necessary element, 43 but what is meant by "intent" and how do
you prove it? A large part of the problem is caused by the fact that, as
Professor Michael Zimmer points out, there is no literal direct evidence of
a state of mind." Thus, some objective evidence must show "intent" under
disparate treatment.45
But what objective evidence proves intent? Here the Court's opinions
are muddled:
Disparate treatment doctrine, whether individual or
systemic, relies ultimately on a finding of intent or motive
to discriminate, and no consensus exists as to what those
concepts embrace or, indeed, whether they are
synonymous. Certain core conduct is clearly prohibited,
namely conscious decision making to exclude members of
particular races either because of animus or other reasons.
But the extent to which less conscious influences count is
unclear forty years after Title VII's passage, and equally
unclear is when a trait will be viewed as sufficiently linked
to race or sex to count as race or gender discrimination
based on that trait.46
What was clear under pre-Ricci law was that "action based on knowing
the race of the individuals affected by the decision ... was not sufficient
proof that the employer acted with an intent to discriminate."A7 As stated
by Professor Michael Selmi, liability for discrimination did not "attach
based on the torts standard of knowledge of the probable effects of [the
type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others
because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.").
43 See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993) (stating that the
employer's decision must be motivated by the employee's protected trait).
4
Michael Zimmer, The Employer's Strategy in Gross v. FBL Financials,
CONCURRINGOPINIONs.coM (Nov. 4, 2009, 10:43 AM), http://www.concurringopinions.
com/archives/2009/1 1/the-employers-strategy-in-gross-v-fbl-financials.html.
45 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976); see also Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251-52 (1989) (plurality opinion).
4 Charles A. Sullivan, DisparateImpact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47
WM. & MARY L. REv. 911, 940 (2005).
47 Michael Zimmer, Ricci: The Interaction of Disparate Treatment and Impact
Discrimination, CONCURRINGOPINIONS.COM (Nov. 22, 2009, 11:55 AM), http://www.
concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/ 1/ricci-the-interaction-of-disparate-treatment-andimpact-discrimination.html.
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defendant's] acts."A
Professor Selmi was referring to Washington v.
Davis,49 which held that the disparate impact theory did not apply to
§ 1983 actions seeking redress for violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment.50 Thus, the fact that a governmental action (there, a
qualifying examination) had a differing effect on whites and blacks was
not sufficient to constitute a cause of action.5' "Intent" was necessary,
which meant that knowledge of differing effects as to race was not
enough.52 The district court in Ricci ruled that having a racial motive for
an action did not make it illegal.53
Another necessary element of disparate treatment was that the bias had
to cause the complained of harm. 54 Whether it has to be the "but for" cause
or just a contributing cause (the "mixed motive" test) has been, and still is,
a matter of controversy.55 We may start with Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 6 where Justice Brennan's plurality of four ruled that the plaintiff
need only show the prohibited intention (there, gender) was a "motivating
factor" in the decision.57 Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, however,
stated that the plaintiff must prove a "substantial" rather than just a
"motivating factor." 8 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 703(m) adopted the
Brennan test, stating that discrimination need only be a "motivating
factor."5 9
The Court revisited the issue in Gross v. FBL Financial Services,
Inc.,6 0 which held that under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), the discrimination must be the "but for" cause of the adverse
employment decision.6 ' The Court rejected the plaintiffs argument that
Michael Selmi, Was the DisparateImpact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV.
701,
731 (2006).
49 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
48

s0 See id. at 239.
51 See id. at 246.
52 See id.

Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 160 (D. Conn. 2006).
See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (plurality opinion).
ss See id. at 262-63 (O'Conner, J., concurring).
5 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
5'Id. at 258.
58 Id. at 265 (O'Conner, J., concurring).
s9 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(m) (2006); see also Sullivan, supra note 46, at 932-33
(discussing the adoption of the Brennan test by Congress).
60 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009).
61
Id. at 2352.
5

54
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the case was controlled by Price Waterhouse, which held that the
discrimination must only be a "motivating factor," not the "but for"
cause. 62 In a footnote, the Court pointed out that Congress amended Title
VII to allow the discrimination to be only a "motivating factor" but did not
amend the ADEA. 63
We are then left with at least two standards of causation: a "motivating
factor" for Title VII and "but for" in ADEA cases. Both tests assume there
has to be some discriminatory intent that to some extent influences the
discriminatory action." If, however, knowledge of a discriminatory racial
result-a result that classifies by race-is sufficient to be discriminatory
treatment, there would be no need to deal with whether a prohibited intent
or motive would be a "motivating factor" or a "but for" cause. This may
well be true for § 1983 suits as well.
B. Ricci Redefines DisparateTreatment
We now come to what disparate treatment means post-Ricci. Although
Justice Kennedy's opinion spends pages describing the efforts expended by
the firefighters who passed the test, the many efforts and resources
expended by the City of New Haven in trying to create a fair test, and the
long process that ended in the tests not being certified; the case's ruling is
simple: the rejection of the test was race-based, and this violated Title
VII.65 "We conclude that race-based action like the City's in this case is
impermissible under Title VII."66
The sentence concludes with a proviso, "[U]nless the employer can
demonstrate a strong basis in evidence that, had it not taken the action, it
would have been liable under the disparate impact statute."6 But how did
"disparate impact" become an issue? It became an issue because the City's
first reaction to the results of the test was that the results were suspect due
to the test's disparate impact on minorities. The City's corporate counsel
convened a meeting with the testing company's vice-president where "City
officials expressed concern that the tests had discriminated against

Id. at 2348-49.
Id. at 2349 (emphasis added).
6 See id. at 2349-50, 2352 (discussing the precedent supporting the need for
discriminatory intent in both Title VII and ADEA cases).
65 Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664-71
(2009).
66 Id. at 2666.
67 Id.
68 Id.
62
63
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minority candidates."69 It was this concern for minority candidates that
demonstrates-as a matter of law-that the City violated Title VII:
Our analysis begins with this premise: The City's
actions would violate the disparate-treatment prohibition
of Title VII absent some valid defense. All the evidence
demonstrates that the City chose not to certify the
examination results because of the statistical disparity
based on race-i.e., how minority candidates had
performed when compared to white candidates. As the
District Court put it, the City rejected the test results
because "too many whites and not enough minorities
would be promoted were the lists to be certified."
(respondents' "own arguments .. . show that the City's
reasons for advocating non-certification were related to the
racial distribution of the results.") Without some other
justification, this express, race-based decisionmaking
violates Title VII's command that employers cannot take
adverse employment actions because of an individual's
race.70
The district court in Ricci had ruled the contrary-having a racial
motive did not equal discrimination. It relied on a Second Circuit case
that noted, "Every antidiscrimination statute aimed at racial discrimination,
and every enforcement measure taken under such a statute, reflects a
concern with race. That does not make such enactments or actions
unlawful or automatically suspect." 7 2 To the contrary, the Supreme
Court's opinion changed this prior law to the extent of providing a racial
preference to the plaintiffs.
69 id.

Id. at 2673 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d
142, 152 (D. Conn. 2006)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
71 Ricci, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 160.
72 Id. at 157 (quoting Hayden v. Cnty. of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 48-49 (2d Cir.1999)).
Both Professor Norton and I find it hard to believe that the Court's majority and dissenting
opinions in Ricci are describing the same case. Norton, supra note 26, at 221-22.
7 See Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 2, at 32-33. Harris and West-Faulcon argue
that:
70

Ricci's doctrinal innovations produce racial asymmetry in the
burdens and presumptions that operate under Title VII law in several
respects. First, by imputing race-specific harm to a race-neutral
(continued)
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Thus, the City or any employer who wants to change a selection
procedure is in a Catch-22 situation. If the reason for change is that the
procedure has a disparate impact, then the reason, being race-based, is a
per se violation of Title VII. 74 All race-based classifications are bad, per
se. 75 Justice Kennedy does give the employer an out-it can and must
"demonstrate a strong basis in evidence that, had it not taken the action, it
would have been liable under the disparate-impact statute."7
Changing
employment practices based on disparate impact, then, is high-risk for the
employer because if the change is based on disparate impact, it
automatically violates Title VII, 7 7 and the only defense is the hard one of
showing, not just some evidence or a preponderance of evidence, but a
"strong basis" in evidence that a disparate impact suit would win. 8 The
defendant must pretend it is a disparate impact plaintiff suing itself and
assess its chances. If it is wrong, it will lose in a disparate treatment suit.
And, if it does or does not change, it may be sued under disparate impact.
This is exactly what happened to the City of New Haven, which was sued
by a firefighter who was not promoted.79

decision, the Ricci plaintiffs were provided a racial preference: Unlike
ordinary Title VII plaintiffs, they were relieved of any requirement of
demonstrating pretext or of proving an impermissible racial
motive.... Under Title VII a determination of this issue would be a
factual inquiry into motive. However, this evidentiary inquiry has been
supplanted by a kind of ipsi dixit logic that equates all inquiries
regarding racial effects or racial dynamics with an illegitimate
discriminatory motive. Prior to Ricci, Second Circuit precedent as well
as established case law in other jurisdictions had flatly rejected this
characterization. Id.
74 See 42
75

U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).

id.

Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009).
n See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l)-(2).
1 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2664.
7 Briscoe v. City of New Haven, No. 3:09-CV-1642 (CSH), 2010 WL 2794212, at *1
(D. Conn. July 12, 2010). The court in Briscoe ruled in favor of the City of New Haven and
dismissed the case. Id. at *12. The district court in Ricci noted that the prior New Haven
promotion tests may well have had a disparate impact. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F.
Supp. 2d 142, 153-54 (D. Conn. 2006) (discussing the differences in pass-fail rates for
minorities and whites).
76
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Note here that the situation is seen as a zero-sum game: changing the
system for the benefit of minorities necessarily constitutes discrimination
against non-minorities.so
This finding of an automatic violation changes a principle of the prior
law in which a preference for one group was not seen as necessarily being
discrimination against the other.8 1 In Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v. Consolidated Service Systems,82 Judge Richard Posner
ruled in favor of an employer who relied on word-of-mouth recruitment
The
and wound up with a work force of almost all Korean ethnicity.
court held that preferring those of Korean descent was not discrimination
against non-Koreans.84 Another instance is the "paramour" cases. The
A male
boss promotes a female employee he has been sleeping with.
employee, who has not been promoted, then sues for gender
discrimination.8 7 The courts have held that there is no discrimination, just
The same result occurs in "cronyism,"
a preference for certain women.
where the boss hires and promotes his male buddies.
Nor does the City's benign motivation, to avoid using a test with a
disparate impact, obviate discriminatory intent:
Whatever the City's ultimate aim-however well
intentioned or benevolent it might have seemed-the City
made its employment decision because of race. The City
rejected the test results solely because the higher scoring
candidates were white. The question is not whether that

so See Norton, supra note 26, at 233.
81 Id. at 229, 234-35.
82 989 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1993).
83

Id. at 234-35.

Id. at 237.
Allen R. Kamp, Anti-Preference in Employment Law: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 18
CHICANO-LATINO L. REv. 59, 63 (1996); see also Michael J. Phillips, The Dubious Title VII
Cause ofAction for Sexual Favoritism,51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 547, 549 (1994).
86 See Phillips,supra note 85, at 549.
87 See id. at 549-50.
88 See Kamp, supra note 85, at
63.
89 B. Stephanie Siegmann, Hire Your Friends: First Circuit Accepts "Cronyism" as
Valid Counterargumentto Title VII DisparateTreatment Action-Foster v. Dalton, 71 F.3d
52 (1st Cir. 1995), 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 991, 992 (1997).
"

85
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conduct was discriminatory but whether the City had a
lawfil justification for its race-based action. 90
In rejecting the City's argument that an "alternative" selection procedure
could be used, the Court again limits disparate impact and expands
disparate treatment.9 1 Under the codification of the disparate impact theory
in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, once the defendant has demonstrated
"business necessity," the plaintiff may show that another selection
procedure-a valid altemative-would have less disparate impact.92 The
City argued that changing the weighting of the written and oral scores from
60/40 to 30/70 would allow it to consider three black candidates for
promotion. 93 The City also argued it could have modified the "rule of
three," which required that any promotions be made only from the three
highest scores on the exam.94 (Note here that the City is arguing against
itself: that it did violate Title VII because it could have used a "valid
alternative.") The Court ruled that would have violated Title VII's
prohibition on adjusting test results based on race. 95 Thus, once a test has
been given, it cannot be changed-even if there is evidence that the test
had a disparate impact-because the change would also be based on race.
This holding both limits disparate impact and expands disparate treatment
in showing that any race-conscious act violates Title VII.

90 Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2674 (2009).
9' Id. at 2679-81.

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii),-2(k)(1)(C) (2006); see also Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at
2673 ("Even if the employer meets [the burden of showing a business necessity], a plaintiff
may still succeed by showing that the employer refuses to adopt an available employment
practice that has less disparate impact. . .
93 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2679.
92

94 id.

(citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(l) (2006)).
& West-Faulcon, supra note 2, at 2. Harris and West-Faulcon point out
that this freezes the status quo:
9s Id. at 2676
96 See Harris

From this vantage point, instead of identifying the most qualified
candidates, New Haven's exams unfairly and unnecessarily reproduced
the fire department's racially (and gender) skewed status quo.
Nevertheless, in Ricci, the City's efforts to ameliorate this racial
imbalance were themselves treated as racially rigging the results,
exemplifying how the pursuit of fair testing was race-d. Id.
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C Limitations on the Scope ofRicci
1. Vested Rights
Two factors in the majority* opinion limit the scope of the opinion. 97
One is that the Court found the plaintiffs had a vested right in their
promotions. In employment discrimination law, this is called an "adverse
employment action," that is some significant term or condition of
employment must have been adversely affected for there to be a cause of
In Jones v. Clinton,0 0 for
action for employment discrimination."
example, Jones lost her suit against President Clinton because the adverse
action against her (for allegedly refusing to perform sexual acts with the
then Governor) was only a job reassignment and not getting flowers for
Secretary's Day.'o'
Ricci's first paragraphs describe the importance of the promotion to
firefighters and their effort to pass the test:
In the fire department of New Haven, Connecticut-as
in emergency-service agencies throughout the Nationfirefighters prize their promotion to and within the officer
ranks. An agency's officers command respect within the
department and in the whole community; and, of course,
added responsibilities command increased salary and
Aware of the intense competition for
benefits.
promotions, New Haven, like many cities, relies on
objective examinations to identify the best qualified
candidates.
In 2003, 118 New Haven firefighters took
examinations to qualify for promotion to the rank of
lieutenant or captain. Promotion examinations in New
Haven (or City) were infrequent, so the stakes were high.
The results would determine which firefighters would be
considered for promotions during the next two years, and
the order in which they would be considered. Many
See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2676.
9' See id.
9 See, e.g., Crady v. Liberty Bank & Trust Co. of Ind., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir.
1993) (dismissing an age discrimination suit because the employer's action had no adverse
effect on the plaintiffs salary, benefits, or responsibilities).
too 990 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Ark. 1998).
'01 Id. at 671.
9
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firefighters studied for months, at considerable personal
and financial cost. 02
The majority opinion goes on to describe how hard Ricci studied for the
test. Ricci suffered from dyslexia, along with other learning disabilities.
Every day, he studied eight to thirteen hours. He spent over $1,000 on
study materials and payments to his neighbor to record them on tape so "he
could 'give it [his] best shot."' 03 Once the selection criteria have been
made clear, employers "may not then invalidate the test results, thus
upsetting an employee's legitimate expectations not to be judged on the
basis of race."' 04
Under the majority opinion, there was a vested right. The question
then, of course becomes "What is a vested right?" One can now indulge in
the law professors' favorite sport of coming up with hypotheticals: let's
say that a state law school has admitted students on the basis of LSAT
scores and undergraduate grade point averages. Noticing that minorities
do worse on the LSAT, the school decides not to require the LSAT score
but to instead look at such factors as community service, job experience,
and extra-curricular activities. A prospective student in preparation for the
LSAT invested money in taking LSAT prep courses, such as Kaplan's, and
spent hours doing practice LSAT tests. He then took the test and did very
well. Did the prospective student have a vested right? Has the law school
violated § 1983?
2. Changingthe Past or Changing the Future?
The majority opinion's second limitation is that the race-consciousness
only invalidated a decision made after the test was applied, not before.'0 o
Kennedy makes clear that the majority opinion applies only to changing
the results retrospectively, not prospectively in designing the test.10 6
129 S. Ct. at 2664.
'o' Id. at 2667.
'4 Id at 2677.
105 See id. at 2676 (stating that an employer may neither rescore nor discard a test to
achieve a more desirable racial distribution).
106Id. at 2677. Justice Kennedy states:
102Ricci,

Title VII does not prohibit an employer from considering, before
administering a test or practice, how to design that test or practice in
order to provide a fair opportunity for all individuals, regardless of their
race. And when, during the test-design stage, an employer invites
comments to ensure the test is fair, that process can provide a common
(continued)
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Professor Zimmer, reading Justice Kennedy's opinions in Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1107 and Ricci
together, concludes that an employer may act prospectively with raceconsciousness, but not retroactively, as in Ricci.'08
Justice Scalia, however, indicates that Equal Protection would
invalidate prospective race-conscious decisions:
[D]isparate-impact laws do not mandate imposition of
quotas, but it is not clear why that should provide a safe
harbor. Would a private employer not be guilty of
unlawful discrimination if he refrained from establishing a
racial hiring quota but intentionally designed his hiring
practices to achieve the same end? Surely he would.
Intentional discrimination is still occurring, just one step
up the chain. Government compulsion of such design
would therefore seemingly violate equal protection
principles.109
Scalia's approach would both grandfather in past practices that have a
disparate impact and cause changes made in order to have a diverse work
force to be illegal. 10 Here I came up with a hypothetical-say an
employer years ago instituted a policy that hired only natural blondes.
There is no evidence that it was racially motivated-the employer just
liked blondes. After someone points out to him that he is not hiring many
southern Europeans, Hispanics, or Asians, he contemplates changing his
system. If he does not change, would he be liable under a disparate impact
theory? If he does change, is he liable under disparate treatment for
establishing a quota?

ground for open discussions toward that end. We hold only that, under
Title VII, before an employer can engage in intentional discrimination
for the asserted purpose of avoiding or remedying an unintentional
disparate impact, the employer must have a strong basis in evidence to
believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to take
the race-conscious, discriminatory action. Id.
107 551 U.S.
108Zimmer,

701 (2007).
supra note 3, at 32.
" Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2682.

110 See id.
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D. The ConcurringOpinions
The concurring opinions of Justices Scalia and Alito (joined by
Justices Scalia and Thomas) go even further in expanding the definition of
disparate treatment.
Scalia writes in terms of disparate impact that are equally applicable to
defining disparate treatment:
As the facts of these cases illustrate, Title VII's disparateimpact provisions place a racial thumb on the scales, often
requiring employers to evaluate the racial outcomes of
their policies, and to make decisions based on (because of)
those racial outcomes. That type of racial decision making
is, as the Court explains, discriminatory."'
Thus, disparate impact requires classification by race, which the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits."12
Justice Alito's concurring opinion argues that the City's concern with
disparate impact was pretextual because "the City's real reason was
illegitimate, namely, the desire to placate a politically important racial

constituency.""13
In support of his position, Alito refers to Reverend Boise Kimber as "a
politically powerful New Haven pastor and a self-professed 'king
maker.""'14 To Alito, the Rev. Kimber's racism is shown by threatening a
race riot during the trial of a black man accused of murdering a white man
and calling whites who questioned his actions racist."'5 Justice Alito notes
the following: Rev. Kimber had personal ties with New Haven Mayor John
DeStefano, opposed the test certification, informed the Mayor of his
opposition, protested to the test certification body, and along with others,
lobbied the Board not to certify the results." 6
To Alito, Kimber's lobbying and the decision of the Mayor to reject
the test results could lead a jury to "easily" find that the City was really
motivated by "a simple desire to please a politically important racial
constituency."17 Thus, although the City may have engaged in intentional
' Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
1 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2684.

112

114

id.

115

Id.

§ 1.

" 6 Id. at 2684-85.
"

7

Id. at 2688.
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racial discrimination, "there are some things that a public official cannot
do, and one of those is engaging in intentional racial discrimination when
making employment decisions.',8 Proving intentional discrimination by
considering the actions of those outside of the government is a powerful
tool to find racial discrimination.
Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan HousingDevelopment Corp.,'9 which laid down a multi-part

test to judge whether a governmental body has engaged in intentional
discrimination, spoke in terms of the statements by governmental officials,
not lay citizens. 120 The Court downplayed the influence of those outside

the government.121
Professors Harris and West-Faulcon point out that the Court ignored
racial statementsl 22 in Palmer v. Thompson,12 3 where the Court found no
constitutional violation when the City of Jackson, Mississippi closed its
swimming pools rather than desegregate them.124 The Mayor was reported
as saying:
'We will do all right this year at the swimming
pools ... but if these agitators keep up their pressure, we

429 U.S. 252 (1977).
120

See id. at 268.

The Court placed special significance on legislative action by

writing:
The legislative or administrative history may be highly relevant,
especially where there are contemporary statements by members of the
decisionmaking body, minutes of its meetings, or report. In some
extraordinary instances, the members might be called to the stand at
trial to testify concerning the purpose of the official action, although
even then such testimony frequently will be barred by privilege. Id.
121 See id. at 269. To minimize the importance of lay opinion in applying the test, the
Court wrote:

In making its findings on this issue, the District Court noted that some
of the opponents of Lincoln Green who spoke at the various hearings
might have been motivated by opposition to minority groups. The court
held, however, that the evidence "does not warrant the conclusion that
this motivated the defendants."
Id. (citation omitted).
122
123

Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 2, at 35.
403 U.S. 217 (1971).

124 Id. at

227.
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would have five colored swimming pools because we are
not going to have any intermingling.' . . . He said the City
now has legislative authority to sell the pools or close
them down if they can't be sold.125
The district court in Ricci ruled that a decision made with a racial and
political motivation is not discrimination: "Defendants' motivation to
avoid making promotions based on a test with racially disparate impact,
even in a political context, does not, as a matter of law, constitute
discriminatory intent."l 26
Alito makes it a lot easier to find a racial motive, and again, such a
motive is bad per se. He makes it too easy-Rev. Kimber was just
exercising his right to express his views to his government.12 7 To Alito,
this is impermissible racism.12 8
All in all, the majority and concurring opinions re-conceptualize
discrimination law:
Thus, through framing the City's conduct as affirmative
action, Ricci doctrinally and conceptually "whitens"
discrimination and "races" test fairness: It positions whites
as the disempowered race vis a vis city officials who are
beholden to politically powerful minorities seeking
unearned preferences for members of their race. Next, it
casts whites as meritorious, hard-working victims of the
racially preferential rigging of test results as against
nonwhites whose test scores presumptively demonstrate
they are not deserving or at least are less so.129

Id. at 250 (internal citations omitted).
Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 160 (D. Conn. 2006).
127 See U.S. CONST. amend.
I.
128 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2684-85 (2009) (Alito,
J., concurring)
(describing actions taken by Rev. Kimber and city officials and concluding that a
reasonable jury could "easily" find intentional racial discrimination on the part of the city).
129 Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note
2, at 13.
125
126
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E. Ricci's Application to Equal Protection
The majority opinion in Ricci specifically stated it was decided under
Title VII only, not the Equal Protection Clause.' However, it cannot be
so limited. As stated by Professor Primus:
It would be a mistake, however, to think of the Ricci
premise as merely statutory. Despite the Court's professed
intention to avoid equal protection issues, the Ricci
premise is properly understood as a constitutional
proposition as well as a statutory one. The reason is that
constitutional antidiscrimination doctrine-that is, the law
of equal protection-has, in the hands of the Supreme
Court, the same substantive content as Title VII's
prohibition on disparate treatment. Obviously the two
doctrinal frameworks diverge in some respects. They
cover different though overlapping sets of parties, and they
have different procedural requirements for plaintiffs filing
causes of action. That said, the conceptual content of the
two frameworks is the same. The conduct prohibited
under one is virtually coextensive with the conduct
prohibited under the other.131
Ricci uses an analytical model appropriate to the Equal Protection
Clause, not Title VII.132 The Court ignored the usual methods of deciding
Title VII claims. 3 3 It did not deal with Title VII's requirement of "adverse
employment action."l 34 (Note that the plaintiffs in Ricci had not yet been
promoted or passed a certified test-the test was to be effective only upon

certification.)13 5
See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2676 ("[B]ecause respondents have not met their burden
under Title VII, we need not decide whether a legitimate fear of disparate impact is ever
sufficient to justify discriminatory treatment under the Constitution.").
1' Richard Primus, The Future ofDisparateImpact, 108 MICH. L. REv. 1341, 1354-55
(2010).
132 See id. at 1357-58 (arguing that the plaintiffs in Ricci alleged a kind of injury that is
typically analyzed as an equal protection problem, not as disparate treatment under Title
VII).
113See id. at 1357 (pointing out that the Ricci Court failed to identify an adverse
employment action that is necessary under Title VII).
134 See id.
135 id.
130
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The district court in Ricci ruled that there was no adverse action. 13
This court used the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green'37 analysis,
standard in disparate treatment cases, to decide the case, but the Supreme
Court ignored it.' 38 Under McDonnell Douglas, if the plaintiff presents a
prima facie case, then the defendant must articulate a "legitimate nondiscriminatory reason" for the disparate treatment, and then the plaintiff
must show that the explanation was pretextual and the adverse action was
the result of discrimination.'39
The Court lastly ignored the tests for motive under Title VII and
instead substituted the Equal Protection test of "predominant motive." 4 0
Justice Kennedy imported the "strong basis in evidence" rule for the
disparate impact defense from earlier court decisions under the Equal
Protection Clause,141 such as City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.14 2 and
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education.143
Ricci is then ultimately an equal protection case and an important one.
Professor Zimmer concludes that it takes us closer to an interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which imposes a "color-blind" standard. '
136Ricci

v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 160 (D. Conn. 2006).

'411 U.S. 792 (1973).
131, at 1358.

38
1 Primus, supra note
39

McDonnell Douglas,411 U.S. at 802-05.
Primus, supra note 131, at 1360-61.
141 See Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 2, at 26 ("Kennedy borrowed the 'strong
basis in evidence' standard the Court set forth previously as applicable to public entities that
voluntar[il]y adopt race-based affirmative action policies.").
1

14

142488

143476
14

U.S. 469, 493-98 (1989).
U.S. 267, 277-78 (1986).

See Michael Zimmer, Ricci: The Equal Protection Implications, CONCURRING

OPINIoNS.CoM (Nov. 28, 2009, 11:40 AM). Professor Zimmer concludes:

In sum, the Ricci Court took one step closer to a statutory and
constitutional "color blind" standard. On one hand, it did not appear to
change the equal protection standard applicable to express racial
classifications that was established in Adarand Constructors: "[AII
racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict
On the other hand, it likely expanded the scope of
scrutiny."
application of strict scrutiny to some, but not all situations, where a
governmental actor (or a private actor acting under compulsion of law)
takes action, knowing the racial consequences of that action. Strict
scrutiny does not apply if that action is taken before expectations have
(continued)
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IV. WHAT COMMENTATORS THINK RICCI MEANS
Turning to some early commentary on Ricci, the consensus is that
Ricci does equate race-conscious decision making with prohibited
disparate treatment. 145 Moreover, such race-conscious decision making is
prohibited under both the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII.146
Professor Richard Primus succinctly describes the holding of Ricci:
If Title VII's prohibition on disparate treatment is
understood as a general requirement of color-blindness in
employment, then it is easy to see any race-conscious
decisionmaking as disparate treatment. Disparate impact
doctrine does require race-conscious decisionmaking, so it
follows that there is a conflict between the two
frameworks. It's as simple as that. No court ever took this
view before, but many people now and in the future will
regard the proposition as obvious. 147
Professor Primus describes how Ricci's promise is a radical departure from
prior law. "No court ever took this view before ....
... Disparate treatment doctrine prohibits race-conscious

decisionmaking, and disparate impact remedies are always
race-conscious. There is accordingly a tension between
the two frameworks. That said, no prior decision ever
conceived of disparate impact doctrine as an exception to
the prohibition on disparate treatment. That is why the
Ricci Court had to state the premise in its own voice and
without citation. From the traditional perspective of
antidiscrimination law, the idea that disparate impact
remedies are as a conceptual matter disparate treatment
problems is a radical departure.149
been established or reliance interests created in individuals. But strict
scrutiny does apply once those expectations have been established.
Id. (quoting in part Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)).
145See Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 2, at 41; see also Primus, supra note 131, at
1349-50.
146See Primus, supra 131, at 1349-50.
147 Id. at 1353.
148 ida
149 Id. at 13 50.
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Historically, disparate treatment under Title VII covered two different
things: one "is about employers applying different rules to employees of
different races (or sexes, etc.)." so Title VII also bans wrongful employer
motive:
Consider a case in which a business located in a heavily
white suburb of a heavily black city has a policy of hiring
only people who live in the suburb. Formally, such a
policy does not treat individual applicants disparately on
the basis of their race. But if the policy is motivated by
the desire to exclude black applicants from the city next
door, it is actionable under the heading "disparate
treatment," despite the absence of disparate treatment by
race in the ordinary-language sense. The discrimination is
intentional, and intentional discrimination is called
"disparate treatment."' 5'
Courts and commentators did not see changes to avoid disparate
impact as involving disparate treatment based on explicit bias,'5 2 nor did
courts see such action as stemming from an impermissible racial motive.'53
1so

.

' Id. at 1351.
152 Id. If a written test has a racially disparate impact and the employer throws
out the
results-as happened in Ricci-the test results are thrown out for all applicants, regardless
of race. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009) (observing that all of the
examinations were thrown out). Any black applicants who did very well on the test are
disadvantaged by the disparate impact remedy along with white applicants who did very
well. White applicants who did poorly may stand to gain along with black applicants who
did poorly. Obviously the decision to throw out the test is race-conscious. But throwing
out the test results does not involve "disparate treatment" in the ordinary-language sense of
sorting employees into groups and conferring a benefit on members of one group that was
withheld from members of the other group. See Primus, supra note 131, at 1350-51. No
two employees are given different tests, nor are separate criteria used to evaluate different
employees, and no job is given to a Mr. Black but denied to a similarly situated Mr. White.
Id. at 1351.
153See Primus, supra note 131, at 1351. The remaining question, then, is whether
throwing out the test results proceeds from a motive that is prohibited under Title VII.
During the early decades of disparate impact doctrine, the easy answer to that question was
no. Id. Disparate impact doctrine was broadly understood as a means of redressing unjust
but persistent racial disadvantage in the workplace, and antidiscrimination law was broadly
tolerant of deliberate measures intended to improve the position of disadvantaged minority
groups. Id. at 1353.
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Professor Michael Zimmer concludes that what the Court found illegal
was acting with the knowledge of racial consequences: "The defendant was
liable to these plaintiffs who were adversely affected by the decision even
though the decision was made in spite of their race, not because of it."l14
This represents a break from prior law.1 5 Disparate treatment dealt
with intentional discrimination proven by either direct or indirect
evidence.' 6 Direct evidence cases, such as L.A. Department of Water &
Power v. Manharts7 and International Union v. Johnson Controls,5 8

involved expressly discriminatory classifications, which divided
employees into two non-overlapping groups."' 9 The statistics were
overwhelming.160
Traditionally, one could not draw an inference of discrimination from
the decision maker's consciousness of the race or gender of the subject
employee. As stated by Justice O'Connor in Price Waterhouse v.
61
Hopkins,1

154 Zimmer, supra note 3, at 4.
155 See Primus, supranote 131, at 1353 ("No court ever took this view before. . .
116 See id at 1342.

" 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
18 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
See Manhart, 435 U.S. at 704 (dividing workers into groups based on sex for the
purpose of allocating pension fund contributions); see also Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at
190 (excluding females from certain jobs to further a "fetal-protection policy"). In indirect
evidence, the reason given, say, for not hiring blacks was shown to be pretextual because
of, for example, overwhelming statistics of racial hiring. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 303 (1988) (describing a school district in which 15.4% of the
population was African-American but only 5.7% of the teachers were black).
160 Michael Zimmer, Color-Blind Standardsin a Race Conscious Society, CONCURRING
OPINIoNs.coM (Nov. 20, 2009, 8:49 AM EST), http://www.concurringopinions.
Prof.
com /archives/2009/11 /ricci-color-blind-standards-in-a-race-conscious-society.html.
Zimmer states that in Ricci:
[T]he white plaintiffs were only 25% of all whites who took the test.
Looking at the statistics alone, it would seem to be unlikely to support
drawing an inference of intentional race discrimination against the
members of any of the six groups without drawing the same inference
as to the members of each of the six groups. That would not be
disparate treatment discrimination. Id.
1

490 U.S. 228 (1988).
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Race and gender always "play a role" in. . . a benign sense
that these are human characteristics of which
decisionmakers are aware and may comment on in a
perfectly neutral fashion. For example, . . . mere reference

to "a lady candidate" might show that gender "played a
role" in the decision, but by no means could support a
rational factfinder's inference that the decision was made

"because of" sex."
The

most

glaring

62

example

is

Personnel Administrator of

Massachusetts v. Feeney,6 1 which found that a preference for veterans
where 98% of the veterans were men, did not show a discriminatory
purpose against women.'6 4
Professor Zimmer concludes:
The Court appeared to take a giant leap from the fact
that the City knew the racial distribution of the testtakers
and the racial consequences of using the test to conclude,
as a matter of law, that the decision not to use the scores
was "because of" the race of the six different groups.

Professor Primus's article, The Future of DisparateImpact, lays out

three interpretations of Ricci: the General, the Institutional, and the Visible
Victims. 66
The "General" would represent a fundamental change in
antidiscrimination law, but its logic is simple: it is "color-blindness,
understood as the rejection of race-conscious governmental action, as the
guiding value of equal protection." 6 7 Under this reading, disparate impact
could only serve as a defense if it "were found to be narrowly tailored to a
compelling governmental interest ... . But compelling interest defenses
are always longshots."' 68

162Id.

at 277.

163442 U.S. 256 (1979).

'6 Id. at 270.
165Michael Zimmer, Ricci: Color-Blind Standards in a Race Conscious Society,
CONCURRING OPINIONs.coM (Sept. 26, 2010, 8:49 PM), http://www.concurringopinions
.com/archives/2009/1 1/ricci-color-blind-standards-in-a-race-conscious-society.html.
' 66 Primus, supra note 131, at 1362.
16 Id. at 1363.
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The "Institutional" reading is that public employers may not institute a
remedy that is race-conscious, but that courts may.16 9 A court adjudicating
a suit by a black man must notice the race of the plaintiff. "On that
institutional reading, Title VII's disparate impact doctrine is still
constitutional, so long as it is implemented by courts. Ricci means only
that employers cannot implement race-conscious remedies by
themselves."o
The "Visible Victims" reading requires specific innocent parties to
trigger liability. For example, in Parents Involved in Community Schools
v. Seattle School District No. 1,171 Justice Kennedy recommended using
facially race-neutral means such as redistricting to further race
integration.172 Another example is then-Governor George W. Bush's Ten
Percent Plan, which admitted all Texas high school graduates in the top ten
percent of their high school class to the University of Texas.'7 President
Bush's Justice Department later considered the Plan as a model.174
Because there were no visible victims, the plan would not violate equal
protection, although it was chosen with race-consciousness.171 Professor
Primus concludes by stating that the way the Court will choose between
the three readings may well depend on the facts of the case that will

present the issue.176
Note that Scalia and Alito (plus Thomas) would come down on the
side of the "General" reading-any race consciousness by anybody is
always bad.17 7 Bruce Willoughby, a Nevada employment lawyer, shows
how this may work in practice, noting that "[t]he court did not provide any
guidelines to educate attorneys and employers on how employers can
determine what qualifies as a 'strong basis in evidence."'" 78 He counsels

Id. at 1344.
'.oId.

at 1369.

"' 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
172See

id. at 789.

173 Primus,

174Id.

supra note 131, at 1369.

at 1370.

I75 Id.

id. at 1385-86.
See Michael Subit, A Plaintiffs Employment Lawyer's Perspective on Ricci v.
DeStefano, 25 AM. B. Ass'N J. LAB. & EMP. 199,208 (2010).
178 Willoughby, supra note 2, at 31.
171See
'n
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that the safest course for an employer is to continue using whatever criteria
is in place, ignoring any disparate impact.17 9

V. THE CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION
Ricci's result did not come from nowhere; it is a product of longstanding conservative opposition to equal protection and civil rights. 80
Kenneth L. Marcus's The War Between Disparate Impact and Equal
Protection may serve as the conservative reading of Ricci.'8 ' It concludes
that state actors "may take narrowly tailored race-conscious actions" to
avoid creating intentional and unconscious discrimination that cannot be
proven through other means.1 82 The Equal Protection Clause, however,
would prevent Title VII from being used to "level racial disparities that do
not arise from intentional or unconscious discrimination." 83 There is
scope, however, to voluntarily avoid "systematic racial biases that do not
arise from an institution's present or prior discriminatory actions."' 84
Marcus equates changing the selection criteria to avoid any disparate
impact on minorities to "rigid quotas based on demographic racial
balancing.' 8 5 He states, "Allocation of public benefits must be made on
an individual basis, rather than on the basis of racial group
membership."'
The bottom line "is that facially neutral employment
decisions will trigger [strict scrutiny] when they are motivated by a
predominantly race-conscious intent."' 87 Marcus predicts that Ricci's
"strong basis in evidence" defense will fall as violative of the Equal

1 Id. Willoughby's conclusion has the support of Professor Norton: "Indeed, Ricci
now gives employers pause before choosing practices that lessen disparate impact
[claims]." Norton, supra note 26, at 231.
Iso See Subit, supra note 177, at 200.
Throughout this article, I use the term
"conservative" as meaning organizations, commentators, justices, and judges who are
generally considered to be or regard themselves as conservatives. I do not mean the term in
any precise or philosophical sense.
181 Kenneth L. Marcus, The War Between Disparate Impact and Equal Protection,
2008-2009 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 53 (2009). It should be noted that the Cato Review is not
an academic publication but that of the Cato Institute, a right-wing lobbying institution.
'82Id.at 55.

8 Id.
' Id. at 65.
Id. at 69.
1 Id. at 71.
1
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Protection Clause.188 Congress cannot require that employers act to
dismantle cultural obstacles to equal opportunity, such as "height and
weight requirements for prison guards that may exclude most women,
rather than directly measuring strength or other job relevant variables."
We have here an example of how a practice can be valid under the no
racial classification test, even though it furthers racial subordination by
freezing in place current racial hierarchies.1 90 Any present subordination is
even constitutionally protected by the Equal Protection Clause.191 We
should pause here in wonder at how the conservatives have managed to
take a Reconstruction amendment, passed after the Civil War,19 2 and turned
it into a mechanism to preserve white privilege.
In 1990, a conservative thinker, Charles Bolick, complained that
conservatives had made "the plight of the white firefighters victimized by

See id. at 83.

Marcus concludes that Title VII's disparate impact provision, as
fall to an Equal Protection claim. Id. Overruling Title VII's
will
currently drafted,
generally would also eliminate any defense based on an
provision
disparate impact
is a strong basis in evidence that their policy violated the
that
there
employer's argument
provision.
.89 Id. at 82.
190 See Harris & Faulcon-West, supra note 2, at 7-8. Harris and Faulcon-West point
out that the present racial and gender make-up of fire departments is the result of
discrimination:
188

Many times before Ricci spoke to the Senate, such women and
nonwhite men testified before Congress. Even after overt exclusion
ended when fire departments became subject to antidiscrimination laws,
officials, often encouraged by white male dominated unions, used
formally neutral selection criteria, including job irrelevant tests, to
preserve the racially and gender skewed status quo previously achieved
by blatant discrimination and nepotism. Time and time again the courts
have been called upon to assess whether the criteria utilized really
assessed job performance or were in fact discrimination by other means.
Courts frequently have found departmental processes unnecessarily
exclusionary, especially for minorities and women. Id.
191See Marcus, supra note 181, at 83.
192 See 15 Stat. 706 (1868) (codified as amended at U.S. CONST. amend. XIV)
(announcing, on July 20, 1868, that Secretary of State William Seward certified that threefourths of the states had ratified the Fourteenth Amendment).
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reverse discrimination" into "the major civil rights issue of our era." 93
Bolick argued, "Given limited resources, public interest litigators should
represent the most disadvantaged individuals and should try whenever
possible to find a plaintiff whose plight outrages people." 94 So, several
years later, we get Frank Ricci, the dyslexic white firefighter, whose
understandable and commendable ambitions for promotion and status were
taken from him by a racial decision.'95 The Ricci plaintiffs used a publicity
campaign to exploit their public appeal, even to the extent of creating a
website.'9 6
Russell Kirk's The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Eliot shows the
conservative antipathy to equal protection.197 He saw the abolitionists and
slavery as morally equivalent:
[T]hat magnificent, simple cavalryman General Nathan
Bedford Forrest listened to a series of highflying speeches
from his old comrades in arms, by way of apologia for the
lost cause; but slavery was scarcely mentioned. Then
Forrest rose up, disgruntled, and announced that if he
hadn't thought he was fighting to keep his niggers, and
other folks' niggers, he never would have gone to war in
the first place.
Human slavery is bad ground for
conservatives to make a stand upon; yet it needs to be
remembered that the wild demands and expectations of the
abolitionists were quite as slippery a foundation for

political decency.19 8
Conservatives generally approved of the antebellum political system.199
The Civil War and Reconstruction "constituted one of the two great crises
193 STEVEN MICHAEL TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE
BATILE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW

86 (2008) (quoting

CLINT BOLICK, UNFINISHED

BUSINESS: A CIVIL RIGHTS STRATEGY FOR AMERICA'S THIRD CENTURY
194 TELES, supra note 193, at 86; BOLICK, supra note 193, at
141.

137 (1990)).

195 See Michael Doyle & David Lightman, Sotomayor Backers Urge Reporters to Probe
New Haven Firefighter, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS (July 10, 2009), http://www.
mcclatchydc.com/2009/07/10/71660/sotomayor-backers-urge-reporters.html.
196Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 2, at 24.
197 RUSSELL KIRK, THE CONSERVATIVE MIND: FROM BURKE TO ELIOT 150 (7th ed.
1985).
.98 Id. at 151.

1 See id. at 150; see also GEORGE. H. NASH, THE CONSERVATIVE INTELLECTUAL
1945, at 326 (ISI Books 30th Anniversary ed. 2006) (1976).

MOVEMENT IN AMERICA SINCE
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in the decline of the Republic." 200 Two conservative writers, Felix Morley
and James J. Kilpatrick, thought that the Fourteenth Amendment was
passed "in a 'scandalous' fashion."20'
The conservative reaction to the Second Reconstruction, epitomized by
Brown v. Board of Education, was much the same. Their reaction to
Brown was hardly one of rejoicing that we had established a "color-blind
constitution." 2 02 Ricci's premise of anti-discrimination being a zero-sum
game hearkens back to Herbert Wechsler's Toward Neutral Principles,in
which he could not find a justification for Brown. 203 The only neutral
principle he could find in Brown was freedom of association, but that
principle did not dictate Brown's result because "the freedom of
association is denied by segregation, [but] integration forces an association
upon those for whom it is ... repugnant." 204 And thus, there is no reason
to prefer one over another: "Given a situation where the state must
practically choose between denying the association to those individuals
who wish it or imposing it on those who would avoid it," there is no reason
to pick one over the other.205
George H. Nash writes in The Conservative Intellectual Movement in
America Since 1945 that L. Brent Bozell, a conservative lawyer, criticized
Brown's "very reasoning.",20 6 Bozell argued that Brown was wrong
because the same Congress that drafted the Fourteenth Amendment
established segregated schools in the District of Columbia.20 7 William F.
Buckley's National Review generally criticized Brown.20 8 In 1957, an
editorial declared:
The central question that emerges ... is whether the
White community in the South is entitled to take such
measures as one necessary to prevail, politically and
200

Nash, supra note 199, at 327.

201Id.

202

See

JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN

V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS

MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY 92 (2001) (discussing widespread white supremacy

in the wake of the Supreme Court's decisions in Brown and Brown II).
203See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 33 (1959) (arguing that equal protection principles did not justify Brown).
204 Id. at 34.
205 Id.
206

See NASH, supra note 199, at 334.

207 Id.
20 8

Id. at 307.
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culturally, in areas where it does not predominate
numerically? The sobering answer is Yes-the White
community is so entitled because, for the time being, it is
the advanced race. .. 209
By 1967, the National Review had evolved to advocate black
separatism.210 "Why not experiment with black administration of black
schools, for example, if that was what a majority of black parents really
wanted? Why be shackled by clich6s about integration?"2 "
Professors Harris and West-Faulcon point that Ricci is a product of the
conservative campaign aimed at disparate impact: "[I]n truth they seek to
bury disparate impact doctrine not to praise it."2 12 The attack on
affirmative action is part of a greater conservative project to extend "the
claim of reverse discrimination to cover voting rights, school
desegregation, and now, disparate impact theory in Ricci."2 13 They
conclude that Ricci may "operationalize" Roberts' mantra-"[t]he way to
stop discrimination [on the basis of race] is to stop discriminating [on the
basis of race]."214
Even though the first conservative reaction to such cases as Brown was
based on an "originalist" interpretation-that there was no historical basis
for desegregation-Justice Scalia (and Justices Thomas, Alito, and
Roberts) have switched to a "color-blind" constitution.215 Under this view,
equality is a zero-sum game, in which relief for one group is harm to
another.2 16 This conservative view recently surfaced in the Sotomayor
209

Id. at 308.
Id. at 437-38.

210

Id. William F. Buckley later recanted and came to be in favor of racial equality. Q
& A on William F. Buckley, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2008, 12:52 PM), http://papercuts.blogs.
nytimes.com/2008/02/27/qa-with-sam-tanenhaus-on-william-f-buckley/ (recounting that
Buckley "said it was a mistake for National Review not to have supported the civil rights
legislation of 1964-65, and later supported a national holiday honoring Dr. Martin Luther
King Jr., whom he grew to admire a good deal, above all for combining spiritual and
political values.").
212 Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 2,
at 39.
213 Id. at
41.
214 Id. at 41-42 (quoting Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.
1, 551
U.S. 701, 748 (2007)).
215 See Weiner, supra note 2, at 69. Weiner argues that what Justice Harlan meant by
"color blind" was that there should be no governmental racial subordination, not that there
should be no racial classification. Id. at 61-63; see also Siegel, supra note 5, at 1519 n.168.
216 Norton, supra note 26, at 202.
211
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confirmation hearings, in which Senator Jeff Sessions of Alabama applied
the zero-sum principle to empathy: "'It seems to me that in Ricci, Judge
Sotomayor's empathy for one group of firefighters turned out to be
prejudice against the others. That is, of course, the logical flaw in the
"empathy standard." Empathy for one party is always prejudice against
others."' 2 17 As to the "color-blind" position, one wonders whether only the
rhetoric has changed and these self-proclaimed conservatives are still
motivated by an animus against the Fourteenth Amendment's being at all
effective.
VI. How Ricci MAKES TITLE VII AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE UNWORKABLE
There is a paradox in Ricci: it may destroy Title VII and the Equal
Protection Clause by both not allowing any relief under them and by
preventing employers and government officials from changing any
practices, while at the same time making it easy for plaintiffs to win
against state government and employers under Title VII and Equal
Protection.
A. The Impossibility ofRelief

Ricci works against providing relief for race discrimination because it
sees providing such relief as a zero-sum game: relief for the victims of
discrimination will necessarily harm those benefited by the discriminatory
practice. 218 In Ricci, throwing out the test to benefit minorities harmed
those who passed the test.219 Moreover, it was invalid because it
necessitated racial classification.220 Using an alternative testing method
was also illegal: "Restricting an employer's ability to discard test results
(and thereby discriminate against qualified candidates on the basis of their
race) also is in keeping with Title VII's express protection of bona fide
promotional examinations."221 Marcus's article argues that choosing any
selection criteria in order to promote racial diversity is subject to strict
scrutiny:
This should have significant ramifications for policies
like the University of Texas's former "Ten Percent Plan,"
217

Id. at 202 (citation omitted).

218 Id. at 203.
219 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2676 (2009).
220

id

221 id
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under which UT guaranteed admissions to students
graduating within the top 10 percent of their high school
class. There is considerable evidence . .. which suggest[s]

that Texas policymakers adopted this plan in order to
diversify the racial composition of UT's student body....
As in Ricci, the government used a facially neutral policy
to pursue a racially conscious agenda. Under Ricci and
ParentsInvolved, the Ten Percent Plan should trigger strict
scrutiny to the extent that Texas's racial motivations
predominated in the institution of the plan.222
Moreover, Congress cannot require changes in selection criteria that work
against minorities, even if these criteria have nothing to do with "merit"that is the actual ability to do the job:
The requirement that employers use less-disparityproducing alternatives can break down practices that
"operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and
are unrelated to measuring job capability." One example
is the use of height and weight requirements for prison
guards that may exclude most women, rather than directly
measuring strength or other job-relevant variables ....
Congress cannot statutorily disassemble such cultural
obstacles to equal opportunity.
Investigating and
responding to the racial impacts of institutional culture are,
after all, race conscious activities that require some degree
Marcus, supra note 181, at 73. Professors Harris and West-Faulcon believe that
applying strict scrutiny to all practices designed to achieve racial diversity will virtually
eliminate all such practices:
222

Finally, the Court's conflation of all racially-attentive processes
with race-negative consequences for whites not only flattens out and
obscures the complex relationship between racial attentiveness and
particular decisions; it does so in ways that skew anti-discrimination
law in favor of whites as a group. Because all remedial measures on
behalf of racial minorities can at some level be characterized as racially
attentive, treating racial attentiveness-attending to the racial
consequences of one's actions-as a form of discriminatory motivation
destabilizes virtually all remedial options, even those expressly
authorized by settled doctrine and federal statutory law.
Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 2, at 33.
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of racial categorization. Strict judicial scrutiny, which
applies in this situation, cannot be satisfied by a
government interest in disassembling employment
obstacles-unless they result from conscious or
*
unconscious discriminatory
animus. 223
Can state actors and private employers voluntarily eliminate or minimize
the disparate impact of selection criteria? Probably not, if the charge is
race-conscious.2 24
To Marcus, employers may voluntarily change employment benefits
that are now not supported by business necessity, but they cannot-due to
the Constitution's ban on race-conscious action-be required to do so. 22 5
Professor Bielby points out that such an argument ignores the reality of
business, which often operates according to closed social systems.226
The only way then to allow employers-and government-to change
practices that have a real discriminatory effect could be to repeal the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII.
Of course, as I will discuss below, Ricci may not, and in my opinion,
certainly will not be extended this far. But Willoughby's advice to
Marcus, supranote 181, at 82.
See id. at 78. Marcus argues that under Equal Protection, Congress cannot require
employers to avoid disparate impact:
223

224

Would the Ricci standard apply to a large private employer that
contemplated race-conscious action to address potential disparateimpact liability? Probably not. After all, Congress cannot require
employers to engage in conduct that, if federally conducted, would
violate the Equal Protection Clause. If the equal protection bars state
actors from engaging in race-conscious activity in order to avoid a
disparate impact, then it also bars Congress from requiring private
employers to do so. For this reason, further deliberations on the issue
underlying Ricci will likely doom the Ricci standard, whether the
reviewing Court is sympathetic to Ricci's premises or not. Id.
225 See id. at 78-79.

William T. Bielby, Accentuate the Positive:Are Good Intentions an Effective Way to
Minimize Systemic Workplace Bias?, 95 VA. L. REv. 117, 123 (2010) ("That definition
ignores the fact that systemic discrimination sometimes is sustained by processes of 'social
closure' through which high status employees consciously or unconsciously isolate or
exclude outsiders, monopolize access to the most desirable jobs via closed social networks,
and develop trust and a sense of mutual obligation ('relatedness') based on social
similarity.").
226
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employers is sound-until the law becomes clear, employers have to be
careful about changing their employment practices.22 7
Like a law chilling free speech, the ban on race-consciousness chills
employer attempts not to discriminate. This approach directly contradicts
Title VII, which is based in large part on voluntary compliance, mediation,
conciliation, and settlement. 22 8
B. Empowering DisparateTreatment Plaintiffs
Although the commentary has focused on how Ricci almost terminated
disparate impact as a viable theory of liability, it must be remembered it
did that only after finding disparate treatment. "Our analysis begins with
this premise: The City's actions would violate the disparate-treatment
prohibition of Title VII absent some valid defense."229
We may see the radical change the Supreme Court decision made in
anti-discrimination law by comparing its opinion with that of the district
court. The district court used the traditional McDonnell Douglas analysis:
Under that framework, plaintiffs must establish a prima
facie case of discrimination on account of race. To do so,
they must prove: (1) membership in a protected class; (2)
qualification for the deposition; (3) an adverse
employment action; and (4) circumstances giving rise to
an inference of discrimination on the basis of membership
in the protected class.230
The court went on to analyze the defendants' proffered "legitimate
non-discriminatory reason" that they desired to comply with the "letter and
spirit of title VII," avoiding a disparate impact. 2 3' The court then analyzed
the plaintiffs' claim that the legitimate non-discriminatory reason was
pretextual.23 2 The court concluded that any racial motive the defendants

Willoughby, supra note 2, at 31.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2006) (noting Title VII requires conciliation before the
E.E.O.C. can file a suit).
229 Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658,
2673 (2009).
230 Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 151-52 (D. Conn. 2006)
(internal citation
omitted).
231 Id. at 152-53. Note that the city's fears were realized as they
were sued under that
theory in Briscoe v. City of New Haven, No. 3:09-CV-1642 (CSH), 2010 WL 2794212, at
*1 (D. Conn. July 12, 2010).
232 See id. at 153-60.
227
228
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had was not discrimination.233 It found that the plaintiffs had not suffered
an adverse employment action, and the political motivations were not
enough to establish discrimination.2 34 As for the Equal Protection claim,
the court held that all the test takers were treated the same-all the results
were discarded.2 35 Moreover, "[t]he intent to remedy the disparate impact
of [the tests] is not equivalent to intent to discriminate against nonminority applicants." 23 6
The Supreme Court simply did not use this traditional analysis at all,
but instead concluded: "Without some other justification, this express,
race-based decisionmaking violates Title VII's command that employers
cannot take adverse employment actions because of an individual's
race." 237
There are two current lawsuits where the plaintiffs rely on the principle
that any express race-based decision making is illegal. In United States v.
City of New York,238 the court found that the City was liable for disparate
treatment against minorities in its hiring of firefighters.23 9 City of New
York, although it does not explicitly rely on Ricci,24 0 neatly demonstrates
how to turn disparate impact into proof of disparate treatment. The
plaintiffs presented a prima facie case by showing that four of the City's
employment practices (the use of two exams on pass-fail basis and the
rank-order selection of applicants based on these two exams) had an
adverse effect on black applicants. 241 As a defense, the City argued that
there was no direct evidence of intent to discriminate, but the court ruled
that there was no need for a smoking gun.242 The City alleged that the
designers of the exams attempted to design valid exams and were not
racially motivated, but the court held that this was irrelevant.2 43 "On the
other hand, a showing that the Exams were constructed properly-that is
that they test for relevant job skills and properly differentiate between
233

Id. at 160.

id.
Id. at 161.
236 Id. at 162 (quoting Hayden v. Cnty. of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 1999)).
237 Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2673 (2009).
238 683 F. Supp. 2d 225 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), later remedial proceedings,681 F. Supp. 2d
274 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
239 Id. at 233.
240 See id. at 249-51.
241 id.
234
235

242

Id. at 251-53.

243

Id. at 254-55.
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better and worse candidates-would be highly relevant to the City's
defense ... .,,244
The City's knowledge of the disparate impact of its
employment practice led to a strong inference of disparate treatment:
The fact that the city's top officials exhibited an attitude of
deliberate indifference to the discriminatory effects of the
hiring policies that they were charged with overseeing
raises a strong inference that intentional discrimination
was the city's "standard operating procedure."245
A case attacking how transportation is funded in the Chicago area,
Munguia v. State of Illinois,24 6 attempts to use Ricci to overrule
Washington v. Davis. Public transportation in the Chicago area is run by
three entities: Metra, which consists of trains that primarily serve the
suburbs; Pace, the suburban bus line; and the Chicago Transit Authority
(CTA), which serves the City. 24 7 The complaint alleges a great disparity
between the Metra, which primarily serves whites, and the CTA, which
primarily serves minorities.24 8 For example, paragraph seven alleges that
the Metra received an operating subsidy of $4.42 a trip whereas the CTA
received $.87.249 For capital funding, the figures are $4.41 and $0.95.250
The taxes are disproportionally heavier on Chicago residents. 2 5' The
compliant maintains that funding suburban riders (who are mostly white) at
a higher level than city riders (who are mostly minority) constitutes
intentional discrimination.2 52
The complaint uses two approaches, both seemingly derived from
Ricci, to demonstrate purposeful discrimination.2 53 The first parallels
Alito's concurrence in describing the political history of the Chicago area's
transportation funding.254 The current system stems from what is known in
244 Id. at 254.

Id. at 266 (quoting Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States., 431 U.S. 324, 336

245

(1977)).

See Complaint at 1, Munguia v. State of Ill., 2010 WL 3172740 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11,
2010)
(No. 10 CV 00055).
24
246

7

Id. at 10.

249

Id at 1-2.
Id. at 2.

250

id

251

Id at 18.

2 52

Id. at 40.

253

Id. at 52-53.

254

Id. at 31-38.

248
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Chicago as the "Council Wars," when the election of a black mayor,
Harold Washington, led to a group of white alderman taking control of the
City Council and fighting the mayor on everything.25 5 The Illinois
legislature also joined in to fight Mayor Washington.256 The complaint
cites racially charged statements, as did Justice Alito, to support the claim
of intentional discrimination.257
The second approach resembles United States v. City of New York, in
which proof of discriminatory impact demonstrated intentional
discrimination. 25 8 The complaint alleges that the CTA was warned that reenacting the funding scheme would violate Title VI of the Federal Civil
Rights Act.259 The reenactment then showed discriminatory intent.260
Section H of the complaint is headed "CTA and Metra Budget Reports
Demonstrate That Defendants Knew of These Disparities for Years."26 1
Thus, again, knowledge of disparities shows intent. Such an approach
would effectively overrule Washington v. Davis, which held that disparate
impact was not enough to establish a constitutional violation.26 2 Under
Ricci, it may well be.
In the first part of this section, I argued that Ricci makes illegal an
employer seeking to change a practice that has a disparate impact. In this
part, I argue that Ricci makes an employer liable for not doing so. Briscoe
demonstrates that this double bind is not just a theoretical concern of
importance only to law professors. Which argument is right? Only time
will tell. In the meantime, the conservative goal of making civil rights law
unworkable seems to have been achieved.
VII.

NOT AS BAD AS IT LOOKS

In reality, Ricci probably will not be extended as far as its logical
implications. Legal doctrines rarely are. For example, at one time it was
predicted by many contracts scholars that promissory estoppel would
25 5
256

257

Id. at 12-13.
Id. at 13-17.
Id. at 15.

Compare City of N.Y. v. U.S., 683 F. Supp. 2d 225, 266 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding
that knowledge of disparate impact gives rise to an inference of intentional discrimination),
with Complaint, supra note 246, at 40-46 (alleging that the defendants' long standing
knowledge of disparate impact amounts to intentional discrimination).
259 Complaint, supra note 246, at 19.
260 id
258

26 1

Id. at 21.

262 Washington

v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244-45 (1976).
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totally displace the role of consideration in contract law.263 Grant Gilmore,
in his Death of Contract, predicted this.264 It never happened.26 5 The
Court will probably find some way to limit its opinion. Furthermore,
because Ricci was a 5-4 opinion,266 just one Justice has to change his or
her mind or be replaced.
The scholarly commentators offer a few limitations. The Harvard
commentary goes back to Justice Kennedy's decision in ParentsInvolved
to conclude that general rules that do not target individuals would be
valid. 267 This interpretation, thus, would permit the Texas Ten Percent
Plan.268
The Harvard commentary also agrees with Professor Primus' "Visible
Victims Reading," under which there has to be a specific harm to identified
innocent parties. 2 69 Let's say that an employer changes its selection criteria

263

See RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 90 (1979); see also GRANT

GILMORE,

THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 1 (Ronald K. L. Collins ed., 2d ed. 1995) (suggesting that law

should, perhaps, stop studying the theory of consideration).
students
264
See GILMORE, supra note 263, at 1.
265 See Robert A. Hillman, The Triumph of Gilmore's the Death of Contract,90
Nw. U.
L. REV. 32, 39-40 (1995); see also Sidney W. DeLong, The New Requirement of
Enforcement Reliance in Commercial Promissory Estoppel: Section 90 as Catch-22, 1997
Wis. L. REV. 943, 950 (1997).
266 Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2658 (2009).
267 The Supreme Court, 2008 Term-Leading Cases, 123 HARV. L. REV. 153, 289
(2009). Commentators at the Harvard Law Review believe that:
[Justice Kennedy] would allow facially neutral but race-conscious
behavior so long as its goals are not invidious and the problem is
addressed in a general way, without subjecting individuals to different
treatment "solely on the basis of a systematic, individual typing by
race." Thus, in the educational context, Justice Kennedy would allow
schools to pursue student body diversity by means including "strategic
site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with general
recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources
for special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a targeted
fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other statistics by
race." Id.
26

See discussionsupra Part VI.A.
See The Supreme Court, 2008 Term, supra note 267; see also Primus, supra note
131, at 1369-75.
8

269
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for the future but does not take any action against those employees already
in place. Is the employer's action illegal? 27 0
To Primus, invisible victims will not get relief:
The concern that a practice marks a group as inferior is
a concern about social meaning, as is the concern that the
government sees people as members of racial groups
rather than as individuals. These have been core matters
of equal protection, and appropriately so. Equal protection
When
aims to reduce the public salience of race.
considering the constitutionality of a race-conscious
intervention, it is therefore useful to ask whether the
measure will reduce or exacerbate the racial divides within
the American public..

.

. Reducing racial divides therefore

calls for sensitivity not just to what is done or what is
intended but what is publicly understood.
As Primus points out, the standard remedies for disparate impact do
not harm third parties. The court can provide disparate impact plaintiffs
with monetary relief and injunctions; however, the court does not
ordinarily fire or demote those employees who were wrongly favored in
hiring or promotion.272 The City of New Haven should have gone ahead
with the promotions and announced that the written/oral ratios would be
changed to allow for more minority promotions, thus, avoiding the double
litigation disaster that it is now faced with. There is a problem with the
270

Professor Primus argues probably not:
Obviously, if the Ten Percent Plan increases the proportion of AfricanAmericans who are admitted to the University of Texas, it also
decreases the proportion of admittees from other racial groups. There
are, in the end, losers .... Successful norm-entrepreneurs could, in
principle, persuade the public that there is no moral difference between
the two kinds of programs. But as a general matter, it has not worked
out that way. At least at this point in history, many people who oppose
classificatory affirmative action are comfortable with alternative
measures that do not exclude identifiable innocent third parties, even
though as a logical matter those alternatives must be excluding
someone.

Primus, supra note 131, at 1370.
21 Id. at 1371-72.
272 Id. at 1374.
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respective seniority rights of the disparate impact plaintiffs, and that of the
favored employers, but that is a far cry from having promotions
rescinded.273
Even though Ricci ignored the requirement of adverse employment
action, 2 74 future courts may rediscover it. Let's say that under in-place
promotion standards, whites are promoted more than blacks. The
employer changes the process for future promotions, but the new process is
not to be put in place for some time. Although the employees had an
expectation of certain standards being applied, they did not do any
studying or preparation for the new standards. For example, assume that
academics who expected to be promoted for excellence in teaching were
told that in the future publication would be required, with all present
professors having a chance to publish. Even if the change were made due
to racial reasons, it is hard to see the affected employees getting any relief.
There is an even less appealing group of plaintiffs. Hannah L. Weiner
has written an excellent student note (under the direction of the above-cited
Professor Primus) pointing out that the academic practice of legacy admits
has (surprise!) a disparate impact against minorities.27 Let's say that an
admissions office takes this to heart and abolishes legacies. Now a group
of sons, daughters, grandsons, and granddaughters of alumni sue. Their
argument is that they could have studied hard and taken SAT prep courses,
but instead, relying on the legacy admits policy of old State U., spent their
high school years partying, dating, vacationing, and generally goofing off.
Could they win a lawsuit?
The "Visible Victim" principle also fits with human psychology,
which does see possession as nine-tenths of the law.276 In experiments,
people are asked to bid on a coffee mug. 2 77 One is now given the mug.278
The amount of money the mug holder will sell the mug for is usually more

See Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747, 757 (1976).
See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (omitting discussion of adverse
employment action from the majority opinion).
275 See Weiner, supra note 2,
at 48.
276 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Virtual Logrolling:
How the Court,
Congress,and the States Multiply Rights, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1545, 1560 (1995).
277 Samuel Issacharoff, Contracting for Employment: The Limited Return of the
Common Law, 74 TEX. L. REv. 1783, 1803 (1996).
278 Id
273

274
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than he had bid for it. 27 9 People usually regard those in possession of
something as having a right to it. 2 80
Ultimately, the majority decision in Ricci rests on the gripping
narrative of the dedicated white working class dyslexic male who has been
injured by liberals engaged in racist social engineering. 28 1 It worked for
Jesse Helms, and it worked in Ricci.28 2 Other less-appealing plaintiffs,
even if subject to race-conscious decision making, will likely have less
success. Their stories will just have less traction and resonance.
The main reason why Ricci will be limited is that it will have to be. If
disparate treatment would apply to such issues as transportation funding in
the Chicago metropolitan area, the courts will have to take over the tax and
spending decisions of municipal corporations. This would overrule
Washington v. Davis, but more importantly would negate the policy behind
that decision. Courts do not want to and cannot take over a government
every time that government engages in racially conscious decision making
283
or knows the consequences of its actions.
Another way for employers to retain some freedom of action-and
avoid the double bind the City of New Haven put itself in-would be to be
disingenuous or just lie. Police officers have used this technique
effectively to circumvent the search and seizure rules.284 Employers can do
the same. Let's posit our employer who only employs natural blondes.
There is nothing in the record that this is due to racism, only that the boss
likes blondes. He, then realizing that his practice discriminates against
employees of Southern European, African, and Asian ancestry, wants to
change. Instead of making a record that he wants to hire more Southern
Europeans, Blacks, Asians, and Hispanics (that would be racist!), he
279

d
Eskridge, supra note 276, at 1560.
281 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664
(2009).
282 See Advertisement, Jesse Helms "Hands" Ad, YouTUBE (Oct. 16, 2006),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KIyewCdXMzk (stating support for a racial quota laws
emphasizes that the color of your skin is more important than your qualifications).
283
See Reshma M. Saujani, "The Implicit Association Test": A Measure of Unconscious
Racism in Legislative Decision-Making, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 395, 399 (2003) (stating that
the United States Supreme Court ceases to defer to legislatures and administrative agency
only when those bodies' actions are motivated by purposeful discrimination).
284 Harry M. Caldwell & Carol A. Chase, The Unruly Exclusionary Rule: Heeding
Justice Blackmun's Call to Examine the Rule in Light of Changing Judicial Understanding
About Its Effects Outside the Courtroom, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 45, 53 (1994) (arguing that
police officers will sometimes lie to avoid the exclusionary rule).
280
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expresses the desire to broaden his hiring criteria for the purpose of
obtaining a more qualified (not a more raciallydiverse) workforce. Many
employers may take this route.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

A. What PlanetAre They On?
Ricci adopts a "post-racial" view, in which "it is not only wrong but
also irrelevant and counter-productive to consider race because race
doesn't matter anymore in significant ways." 28 5 But, as Stanley Fish writes
in his New York Times blog, "Think Again," Ricci's view of the law is
impossible:
New Haven's act of abandoning a test adopted in a goodfaith, non-discriminatory spirit is itself discriminatory in
operation, and not even "fair in form" to the white
firefighters who studied and took their chances like
everyone else. "This express, race-based decision-making
violates Title VII's command that employers cannot take
adverse employment actions because of an individual's
race."
These words (of Justice Kennedy's) imply that there
was some action New Haven might have taken that would
not have fallen under the description "because of an
individual's race." But any action the city might take
would be taken under the shadow of the law's concern for
race and would therefore have been a "race-based" action.
Without a concern for race there would be no Civil Rights
Act, no Title VII, no categories of disparate treatment and
disparate impact.
Acting on the basis of race is not an option; it is an
inevitability, even though all parties claim to be neutral
with respect to race and reject any suggestion that race
consciousness informs their positions. . . . "Because of

race" is the name of the game and no one can escape it.
... Not only is there no escape from race; there is no

possibility that those who are obsessed by it--everyone in
285

Norton, supra note 26, at 209.

I consider "post-racialism" to be a form of
psychological denial of reality-if we just ignore race, it will go away.
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this case-can ever find the peace Scalia imagines in some
nebulous future or the complementariness Ginsburg
incorrectly assumes in the present. 286
Reading the concurring opinions of Alito and Scalia and some of the
commentary makes one wonder what planet the authors are living on. The
title of Professor Zimmer's forthcoming article puts it very well: Ricci's
Color-BlindStandardin a Race Conscious Society: A Case of Unintended

Consequences?2 87
It is very hard to come up with a selection criterion that does not have
a racial disparate impact. 288 All selection-on the basis of zip codes, the
Ten Percent Plan, legacies, SAT and LSAT scores, written tests, oral tests,
attractiveness-will produce differing results, all of which correlate with
race.2 89 Ricci makes it harder to bring a disparate impact suit,2 90 but a
plaintiff can easily convert disparate impact into disparate treatment. If the
racial result of the selection criterion is known in advance, then the
decision to use that criterion is race-conscious and illegal. If a criterion
once used produces a racial disparity, then using it again is disparate
treatment. The latter is the exact theory that has won summary judgment
for blacks in United States v. New York City.2 9 1
Thus, disparate impact has devolved into the common-law first bite
rule for dogS292 -one can give one test that has a disparate impact, but after
that, it is disparate treatment.
Stanley Eugene Fish, Because of Race: Ricci v. DeStefano, THE NEW YORK TIMES
OPINIONATOR (July 13, 2009, 10:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/13/
because-of-race-ricci-v-destefano/.
287 Zimmer, supra note
3.
288 See discussionsupra Parts III.C.1, VI.A.
289 See, e.g., Complaint at 2-3, E.E.O.C. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., No. 09CV-602-GKF-FHM (N.D. Okla. Sept. 17, 2009) (showing the E.E.O.C. sued Abercrombie
for hiring on the basis of attractiveness, which meant young, white, buffed, not disabled,
and 290
sexy).
See supra Part VI.
291 See United States v. City of N.Y., 683 F. Supp. 2d 225, 249 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
292 3B C.J.S. Animals § 346 (2006) ("A person, although not the owner of a vicious dog,
may make himself liable to others by knowingly keeping or harboring the dog upon his
286

premises, after knowledge of his vicious propensities . . . ."). Professor Joseph Seiner and

Benjamin Gutman point out, however, that a properly performed validation study provides a
limited safe harbor from disparate impact liability and immunizes the employer from afterthe-fact second-guessing by a fact-finder in court. Joseph A. Seiner & Benjamin Gutman,
Does Ricci Herald a New Disparate Impact?, 90 B.U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2010)
(continued)
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Ricci effectively overrules Washington v. Davis. We may see this in
Munguia v. State of Illinois, where plaintiffs are challenging the
transportation funding for the Chicago area.293 The plaintiffs claim that the
current allocation of revenues for transportation funding in the area favors
The plaintiffs' tactic is to circumvent
whites over minorities.29 4
Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights by pleading evidence of racial
bias in the initial allocation of funds and the subsequent knowledge that the
white areas are better funded than the minority areas.2 95 This knowledge,
plaintiffs maintain, constitutes intent.296
Even more importantly, decision makers cannot act behind a veil of
Employers generally know the racial
ignorance in our society.
consequences of their actions.297 Federal contractors have to keep statistics
on the racial breakdown of their personnel.298 For faculty hiring, the race
and gender of the faculty candidate interviewing at the annual American
Association of Law Schools hiring conference is given in the upper righthand corner of the candidate's one-page summary.299
My views may be influenced by living in Chicago, where racial groups
and ethnic groups, even those whose ancestors immigrated in the
Nineteenth Century, call themselves such things as Irish, Norwegian, or
Swedish. 300 And groups are defined narrowly; the Irish are West or South
(manuscript at 34), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=15
64244&http://www.google.com/search?source=ig&hl=en&rlz=IGITSNACENUS379&=&
q=Does+Ricci+herald+a+new+disparate+impact%3F+pdf&aq=f&aqi=&aql=&oq=&gs rfa
i=CryagOUayTKKCGoqINtznyB8AAACqBAVPOGp8og.
293 Munguia v. Illinois, No. 10-CV-0055, 2010 WL 3172740, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11,
2010).
294 See id. at *1, *9.
295 See supra text accompanying notes 246-51.
296 See supra text accompanying note 252.
297 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2682 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(stating
that Title VII requires employers to evaluate the racial outcomes of their employment
practices, which implies that they must be aware of those outcomes).
298 41 C.F.R. § 60.12(c) (2006).
299 See Pati Abdullina, Association of American Law Schools Statistical Report
on Law
Faculty 2007-2008, AM. Ass'N L. SCH. 15 (last visited Dec. 12, 2010), http://www.aals.org
/statistics/report-07-08.pdf (showing that race is a self-identified item on faculty candidate
summaries).
300 See David Roediger, Racism, Ethnicity and White Identity, THE ELECTRONIC
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHICAGO (Sept. 27, 2010), http://encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org
/pages/1033.html; see also Ellen Skerrett, Irish, THE ELECTRONIC ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CHICAGO (Sept. 27, 2010), http://encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/652.html.
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Side Irish, the Hispanics are Mexican, Puerto Rican, or Cuban.30 1 One
student this semester told me that although her name ended in "ski," she
was Ukrainian, not Polish. Students at John Marshall can join Black,
Hispanic, Jewish, Muslim, Irish, Italian, Arabic, Greek, Asian, and MiddleEastern student organizations (among others) and then list these
organizations on their resumes. 30 2 Because people frequently proclaim
their racial and ethnic identities by putting ethnic insignia (such as national
flags) on their cars and clothing,303 it would be impossible for a decision
maker to be "color-blind." In a factory, all the boss would have to do is
walk onto the shop floor. Under Ricci, the intent to discriminate and the
"because of race elements" are established by a party's knowledge of the
racial consequences:
The intent to discriminate element, which traditionally has
been the hardest to prove, becomes simply a question of
the defendant's knowledge of the racial consequences
without more. Not only is plaintiffs burden of proving
intent vastly simplified, the Court's approach seems to
knock out the linkage, the "because of' race element, that
supposedly joins a defendant's intent to discriminate to an
adverse employment action suffered by the plaintiff
304
"because of" the victim's race.
Justice Alito's use of the presence of the black activists to prove New
Haven's desire to placate a racial minority is even more bizarre, given the
realities of American politics. A large portion of the actions of the city of
Chicago are done to placate a racial minority.30 s Dividing up the pie on
301

See Roediger, supra note 300.

302 See Student Organizations, THE JOHN MARSHALL LAw SCHOOL (Sept. 27, 2010),

http://www.jmls.edu/students/organizations/index.shtml.
303 See KATHLEEN STASSEN BERGER, THE DEVELOPING PERSON THROUGH CHILDHOOD
AND ADOLESCENCE 16 (Jessica Bayne et al. eds., 6th ed. 2003) (identifying flags, bumperstickers, and other insignia as ways of broadcasting ethnic identity).
Professor Zimmer proposes that employers use the
3 Zimmer, supra note 165.
election process of symphony orchestras, using a blind between the evaluators and the
performers. Id. (Professor Zimmer has told me he was being facetious.).
305 See, e.g., Stefanie Chambers, Urban Education Reform and Minority Political
Empowerment, 117 POL. SCI. Q. 643, 643-44 (2002) (describing increased government
responsiveness to minority community needs in Chicago and other urban areas);
Community Tensions and Hate Crimes, THE CITY OF CHICAGO'S OFFICIAL SITE (Sept. 27,
2010), http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/cchr/provdrs/hatecrimes.html.http://w
(continued)
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racial and ethnic lines has been an operative principle of American politics
for centuries.30 6 All that Rev. Kimber did was use the political process to
represent his constituency,30 7 which one would think he had a
constitutional right to do. Almost all cities in the United States have black,
Hispanic, white, or whatever activists.30 s Title VII was passed in large part
due to the actions of a black activist, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.309 Under
Alito, Thomas, and Scalia's view, perhaps the majority of governmental
action is unconstitutional, including their appointment to the Supreme
Court. Do Justices Scalia, Alito, and Thomas think that their appointments
were not to a large part related to their race or ethnicity?
So if Title VII and the Fourteenth Amendment require that we use
criteria that are "color blind," we can use few meaningful criteria (a
restaurant maitre d'h~tel told me that he only hired Virgos-this would be
a race neutral criterion). Almost any meaningful selection criterion will
have some disparate impact, and once that impact is known-and it almost
always will be-the decision to continue or stop using it will be a raceconscious decision.
ww.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/cdph/provdrs/pol plan-access/svcs/toward_a_healthyfu
turetoolkit.html (describing the services of Chicago's Intergroup Relations Unit, an agency
tasked with resolving conflicts between different races and ethnicities); Boards and
Commissions Directory,THE CITY OF CHICAGO'S OFFICIAL SITE (Sept. 27, 2010), http://web
apps.cityofchicago.org/moboco/org/cityofchicago/moboc/controller/view/start.do (featuring
six Chicago advisory councils specific to racial and ethnic minorities).
3 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483, 486-96 (1954) (evaluating a state
policy of dividing the right to attend public schools along racial lines); Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537, 537 (1896) (evaluating a state policy of dividing the right to use mass transit
along racial lines); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 393 (1856) (evaluating the right to
sue in federal court along racial lines).
307 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2685-86 (2009) (describing Rev. Kimber's
telephone calls and attendance at public meetings to oppose certification of the promotion
exam).
308 See, e.g., About Us, PRESENTE.ORG (Sept 27, 2010), http://prsente.org/about
(describing the presence of the Latino activist group in over one hundred U.S. cities);
Community Partners, ASIAN AMERICAN JUSTICE CENTER (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.
advancingequality.org/communityjpartners/ (describing the presence of the Asian activist
group in forty-eight U.S. cities); Find You Local Unit, NAACP (Sept. 27, 2010), http:///
www.naacp.org/pages/find_yourlocal-unit/ (describing the presence of the AfricanAmerican activist group in over 2,000 local units throughout the United States).
3
See NICK KOTZ, JUDGMENT DAYS: LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON, MARTIN LUTHER KING
JR., AND THE LAWS THAT CHANGED AMERICA 333 (2005); ADAM FAIRCLOGH, BETTER DAY
COMING: BLACKS AND EQUALITY

1890-2000, at 292-93 (2001).
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B. Self-Consuming Artifacts

Here we refer to another work by Stanley Fish, Self-Consuming
Artifacts. There, Fish argues that certain seventeenth century poems are
dialectic, and that the way they proceed is to use art to convey the reader to
a point where he transcends art:
[A] dialectical presentation succeeds at its own expense;
for by conveying those who experience it to a point where
they are beyond the aid that discursive or rational forms
can offer, it becomes the vehicle of its own abandonment.
Hence, the title of this study, Self-Consuming
Artifacts. .. .310

Similarly, Equal Protection and Title VII should, in the conservative
view, work only towards destroying their reason for existence-to achieve
racial equality-because their success will make it impossible to consider
race.31 "A self-consuming artifact signifies most successfully when it
fails ....

312

Ricci's adoption of the no "racial classification" reading of equal
protection may mean that the only way to move towards greater racial
equality would be to repeal the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII. The
amendment and the statute both require the race-consciousness, which both
the amendment and the statute then make unconstitutional and illegal. 13
Here we consider again the Second Circuit opinion quoted by the district
court in Ricci: "[E]very antidiscrimination statute aimed at racial
discrimination, and every enforcement measure taken under such a statute,

310

STANLEY

EUGENE

FISH,

SELF-CONSUMING

ARTIFACTS:

THE EXPERIENCE

OF

SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY LITERATURE 3 (1972).

31"See Michael J. Songer, Decline of Title VII DisparateImpact: The Role of the 1991
Civil Rights Act and the Ideologies of Federal Judges, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 247, 269-70
(2005) (discussing how the views of conservative judges have allowed African Americans
virtually no redress yet racial inequality lingers).
312 FISH, supra note 310, at 4.
313 Compare Mary C. Daly, Some Runs, Some Hits, Some Errors-KeepingScore in the

Affirmative Action Ballpark from Weber to Johnson, 30 B.C. L. REV. 1, 9-11 (1988)
(describing a public sector employer's ability to adopt race-conscious hiring policies based
on equal protection and Title VII), with Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2676 (stating
that similar interests are at play under both the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII and
holding that New Haven's race-conscious remedy violated Title VII).
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reflects a concern with race. That does not make such enactments or
actions unlawful or automatically suspect ....
So, under the majority opinion in Ricci, the Fourteenth Amendmentpassed after the Civil War, which was fought to a large extent "because of
race" 3 1 -and The Civil Rights Act of 1964-passed primarily to end long
standing and pervasive discrimination against African-AmericansThe
prohibit acts done to redress discriminatory racial practices.1
Amendment and Act destroy themselves.
C. Ricci's Dilemmas
Ricci poses a multitude of dilemmas for the lawyers, their clients, and
the courts. "Dilemma" is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as "[a]
form of argument involving an adversary in the choice of two (or, loosely,
more) alternatives, either of which is (or appears) equally unfavorable to
him." 3 17 I have posed in this paper several dilemmas, which the courts will
have to resolve. These include:
1. Whether an employer can choose a particular selection criterion to
promote racial diversity?"1
2. Can an employer change a present selection procedure that
adversely affects minorities, even if the practice is not justified by business
necessity? 319
3. Will disparate impact have a future? Or, more broadly, can
Congress invalidate a selection criterion that adversely affects minorities,
even if it has nothing to do with merit? 3 20
4. Is the McDonnell Douglas analysis no longer good law? 3 2 1
5. Can one convert a disparate impact claim to disparate treatment if
the employer knows that a particular selection criterion used in the past has
a disparate impact? In other words, is the theory of liability in U.S. v. City
ofNew York viable? 322
Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 157 (D. Conn. 2006) (quoting Hayden v.
Cnty. of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 48-49 (2d Cir. 1999)).
"' See Ricci, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 161-62.
316 See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2673.
3 CLARENDON PREsS, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 664 (2d ed. 1989).
3 See discussion supra Part III.B.
319See discussionsupra Part VI.A.
320 See discussion supra Part
III.B.
321 See discussion supra Part IlI.E.
322 See discussion supra Part VI.B.
314
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6. Has Washington v. Davis been overruled or, in other words, will
Munguia succeed in changing the transportation funding of the Chicago
area? 323
7. Will Ricci be applied prospectively or only retroactively, that is, can
any future selection criteria be changed?3 24
8. Will Primus's "Visible Victims" limitation principle be adopted? 325
9. Does Ricci lower the standards for finding a test's validity or, more
broadly, business necessity? 32 6
The ultimate question is whether Title VII will have to be repealed to save
it.

See discussion supra Part VI.B.
See discussionsupra Part III.C.2.
325 See discussionsupra Part
IV.
326 See discussionsupra Parts III.B,
III.C.1.

323
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